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Abstract
The author proposes a typology for the case study following a definition wherein various layers of classificatory principle 
are disaggregated. First, a clear distinction is drawn between two parts: (1) the subject of the study, which is the case 
itself, and (2) the object, which is the analytical frame or theory through which the subject is viewed and which the subject 
explicates. Beyond this distinction the case study is presented as classifiable by its purposes and the approaches adopted—
principally with a distinction drawn between theory-centered and illustrative study. Beyond this, there are distinctions to 
be drawn among various operational structures that concern comparative versus noncomparative versions of the form 
and the ways that the study may employ time. The typology reveals that there are numerous valid permutations of these 
dimensions and many trajectories, therefore, open to the case inquirer.
Keywords
case study, typology, epistemology
The Need for a Typology
Case study research is one of the principal means by which 
inquiry is conducted in the social sciences. Reviewing work 
in economics and political science (Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2003; Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 
1998; Rodrik, 2003), Gerring (2004, p. 341) concludes that 
the use of the case study is “solidly ensconced and, perhaps, 
even thriving.” Bennett, Barth, and Rutherford (2003) showed 
that, in 14 journals focusing on 2 areas of research in social 
science, the proportion of articles in which a case study was 
employed remained broadly stable at about 20% over the 
period between 1975 and 2000.
Despite the popularity of the case study design frame, 
there is little in the way of organizational structure to guide 
the intending case inquirer. Gerring (2004, p. 341) contin-
ues his review with this comment: “Practitioners continue 
to ply their trade but have difficulty articulating what it is 
that they are doing, methodologically speaking. The case 
study survives in a curious methodological limbo.” de Vaus 
(2001, p. 219) agrees, in discussing the way that the case 
study is explained: “Most research methods texts either 
ignore case studies or confuse them with other types of 
social research.”
If “methodological limbo” exists it is not for lack of 
methodological discussion. Indeed, this has been extensive 
over the past 40 years across the social sciences—see, for 
example, Simons (2009), Yin (2009), Mitchell (2006), 
Flyvbjerg (2006), George and Bennett (2005), Stake (2005), 
Hammersley and Gomm (2000), Bassey (1999), Ragin and 
Becker (1992), Merriam (1988), Eckstein (1975), and Lijphart 
(1971). The problem is perhaps that methodological discus-
sion of case study has tended to focus on its epistemological 
status, its generalizing “power,” or on various aspects of 
study construction. Less conspicuous, though, has been any 
synthesis of the discussion that might offer classificatory 
schemata for intending researchers: There have been only 
limited attempts to offer intending inquirers a Gestalt, map-
ping out the terrain and potential routes to travel. By way of 
response to this state of affairs, I overview some of the ways 
in which case study is discussed and defined in order to pro-
pose a framing structure and typology for case study. In 
doing this I attempt to disentangle the threads and layers of 
classificatory principle that have become interwoven in dia-
logue about the place and use of the case study.
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Definition
Differing themes and priorities characterize attempts at 
definition of the case study. This is to some extent expli-
cable by the diversity of epistemological starting points 
from which practitioners and analysts of the case study 
arrive. While those from sociology, education, and psy-
chology have tended to see the case study in an interpretiv-
ist frame, those from business, politics, and other areas may 
espouse the interpretivist holism of case study but address 
this through what George and Bennett (2005, p. 5) have 
called “neopositivist” means via the identification of vari-
ables to be studied—see, for example, the discussions of 
Luker (2008) and Yin (2009). By contrast, those in medi-
cine and the law have tended to see the case study princi-
pally as a vehicle for exemplifying or illustrating novel or 
archetypal phenomena.
Notwithstanding these differences, strong commonali-
ties exist across disciplinary margins. Reviewing a number 
of definitions of case study, Simons (2009) concludes that 
what unites them is a commitment to studying the complex-
ity that is involved in real situations and to defining case 
study other than by the methods of data collection that it 
employs. On the basis of these commonalities she offers 
this definition:
Case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple 
perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a 
particular project, policy, institution, program or sys-
tem in a “real life” context. (p. 21)
To Simons’s definition, I should emphasize the point she 
makes in her preliminary discussion that case study should 
not be seen as a method in and of itself. Rather, it is a design 
frame that may incorporate a number of methods. Stake 
(2005, p. 443) puts it this way:
Case study is not a methodological choice but a choice 
of what is to be studied. . . . By whatever methods we 
choose to study the case. We could study it analyti-
cally or holistically, entirely by repeated measures or 
hermeneutically, organically or culturally, and by mixed 
methods—but we concentrate, at least for the time 
being, on the case.
Choice of method, then, does not define case study: 
analytical eclecticism is the key.
Ragin (1992, p. 5) centers his definition on the case 
study’s contrast with what we might call “variable-led” 
research. Rather than looking at few variables in a large 
number of cases, the case inquirer looks at the complex 
interaction of many factors in few cases: The “extensive-
ness” of the former is discarded for the “intensiveness” the 
latter offers. There is a “trade-off,” as Hammersley and 
Gomm (2000, p. 2) put it, between the strength of a rich, 
in-depth explanatory narrative emerging from a very 
restricted number of cases and the capacity for generaliza-
tion that a larger sample of a wider population can offer. 
Ragin puts it thus:
The . . . case-oriented approach places cases, not 
variables, center stage. But what is a case? Compar-
ative social science has a ready-made, convention-
alized answer to this question: Boundaries around 
places and time periods define cases (e.g., Italy after 
World War II). [p. 5]
Ragin’s definitional discussion serves two purposes: It 
contrasts the emphasis on cases with an emphasis on 
variables in other kinds of research. In discussing the 
boundary, it also stresses the particularity noted by 
Simons and Stake—wherein the parameters of particular-
ity are set by spatial, temporal, personal, organizational, 
or other factors. 
One important feature of cases only alluded to in the 
definitions discussed thus far is any emphasis on the signifi-
cance of an analytical frame in the constitution of the study. 
For example, while the Korean War as a subject of study 
might satisfy conditions of singularity, boundedness, and 
complexity it would not be a case study—or at least not 
the kind of case study that would be of interest to social 
scientists—unless it could be said to be a case of something, 
and that “of” would constitute the study’s analytical frame. 
The Korean War’s status as a case of something has to be 
established. Is it a case of a war? If so, can it be said that it 
is a case of an especially remarkable or unusual kind of 
war? Perhaps, by contrast, it may be a case of a border dis-
pute or of U.S. resistance to the perceived threat of com-
munist expansion. George and Bennett (2005, p. 69) put it 
this way: “The investigator should clearly identify the 
universe—that is, the ‘class’ or ‘subclass’ of events—of 
which a single case or a group of cases to be studied are 
instances.” The subject of the study is thus an instance of 
some phenomenon, and the latter—the phenomenon—
comprises the analytical frame.
Although writing earlier than George and Bennett, 
Wieviorka (1992, p. 159) showed that the case is not simply 
an instance of a class. He unpacked in more detail the dis-
tinctions between the case and the class by noting that when 
we talk about a case we are in fact talking about two ele-
ments: First, there is what he calls a “practical, historical 
unity.” We might call this the subject—in my example, 
above, it would be the Korean War. Second, there is what 
he calls the “theoretical, scientific basis” of the case (such 
as U.S. resistance to putative communist expansion, in the 
same example). This latter forms the analytical or theoreti-
cal frame, and we might call this the object of the study. The 
notion of a “theoretical, scientific basis” thus delimits the 
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“class”: The class has to offer more than a set of similar 
instances. So, the class cannot comprise merely similar phe-
nomena (e.g., wars) but those phenomena as instances of an 
analytical focus (e.g., resistance to perceived communist 
expansion). Wieviorka continues:
For a “case” to exist, we must be able to identify a 
characteristic unit. . . . This unit must be observed, but 
it has no meaning in itself. It is significant only if an 
observer . . . can refer it to an analytical category or 
theory. It does not suffice to observe a social phenom-
enon, historical event, or set of behaviors in order to 
declare them to be “cases.” If you want to talk about 
a “case,” you also need the means of interpreting it or 
placing it in a context. (Wieviorka, 1992, p. 160)
It is important to stress the significance of the separate-
ness of the subject and the object in case study since the 
distinction between the one and the other is characteristic of 
all social inquiry, yet relatively neglected in discussion of 
the case study. It is defined variously in different kinds of 
research. In his classic work on sociological theory, Wallace 
(1969, p. 3) pinpointed the significance of the distinction 
between (a) the thing to be explained and (b) the explana-
tion in a piece of research by calling the thing to be explained 
the explanandum and the thing doing the explaining the 
explanans. Some time earlier, Hempel and Oppenheim 
(1948) had drawn attention to the need for such a differen-
tiation to account for the ability of science to answer “why” 
rather than simply “what” questions. In social science—
where we also want to answer “why” rather than “what” ques-
tions—one of the more straightforward means of making 
this distinction is by differentiation between dependent and 
independent variables, yet this of course is not the only way 
of doing it, and case inquirers need to be aware of this.
Case inquirers need to be aware of it because Wallace 
went further, aligning the explanandum with the dependent 
variable, and the explanans with the independent variable, 
and Eckstein (1975) refers to the analytical frame in a case 
study as a single measure on a variable. But one surely 
needs to be guarded in the use of terms associated with 
variable-led research when thinking about idiographic 
research. The extension of explanandum and explanans to 
variables by Wallace (and many after him) is, perhaps, met-
aphorical. But if this is so—if it is indeed a metaphor—it is 
a dangerous one if extended to all kinds of research, includ-
ing the idiographic. In fact, here it becomes more like cata-
chresis than metaphor: Let us take the example again of the 
World War II (subject) as a case study of a “just war” (object). 
Here, the notion of justness is the explanandum (the thing to 
be explained), and the thing doing the explaining—the 
explanans—is World War II. This is a quite valid use of the 
explanandum/explanans distinction as promoted by Hempel 
and Oppenheim and Wallace. But the idea that the explanans 
can be seen as an independent variable so grossly violates 
our expectations of an independent variable (e.g., singular 
rather than complex; manipulable experimentally) that it 
ceases to be tenable.
Likewise, use of the similar term “unit” is confusing, 
being adopted by Wieviorka to refer to the case (the sub-
ject), while VanWynsberghe and Khan (2007, p. 87), for 
example, use it to mean the object. (They say, “The inter-
play between the unit of analysis and the case is a constitu-
tive element of case study research” [italics added].) These 
confusions have arisen, I think, partly because of the neo-
positivist discourse surrounding so much methodological 
discussion concerning case study, of which the “variable-
led” discussion of explanans and explanandum is an exam-
ple. As another example, look at Lijphart’s (1971, p. 684) 
distinction between experimental, statistical, and compara-
tive method in social science, in which he asserts that in 
areas such as political history comparative method has to be 
“resorted to” because of the small number of potential cases 
and the invalidity of “credible controls.” I discuss Lijphart’s 
analysis in more detail later.
The ostensible looseness of the case study as a form of 
inquiry and the conspicuous primacy given to the case (the 
subject) is perhaps a reason for inexperienced social inquir-
ers, especially students, to neglect to establish any kind of 
object (literally and technically) for their inquiries. Identifying 
only a subject, they fail to seek to explain anything, provid-
ing instead, therefore, a simple description in place of a 
piece of research. For the study to constitute research, there 
has to be something to be explained (an object) and some-
thing potentially to offer explanation (the analysis of the 
circumstances of a subject).
In brief, as a conclusion to this discussion, I suggest that 
a case study must comprise two elements:
1. A “practical, historical unity,” which I shall call 
the subject of the case study, and
2. An analytical or theoretical frame, which I shall 
call the object of the study.
Taking account of this, the definition of case study that 
I shall adopt for the typology I develop here is as follows:
Case studies are analyses of persons, events, deci-
sions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other 
systems that are studied holistically by one or more 
methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry 
will be an instance of a class of phenomena that pro-
vides an analytical frame—an object—within which 
the study is conducted and which the case illuminates 
and explicates.
I give below an explication of some of the elements and 
dimensions just discussed, noting points about the kinds of 
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selection and decision likely to be necessary during the case 
study. This is done to provide a rationale for the typology 
ultimately summarized in Figure 1.
The Subject and Object
Subject
In making a central distinction between subject and object 
of study, the definition at which I have arrived leads us first 
into questions about how the subject is identified—whether 
that subject is a Glasgow gang (Patrick, 1973), the Head 
Start education program (Zigler & Muenchow, 1992), or an 
international coffee organization (Bates, 1998). The subject 
is in no sense a sample, representative of a wider popula-
tion (and I discuss this further below). Rather, the subject 
will be selected because it is an interesting or unusual or 
revealing example through which the lineaments of the 
object can be refracted. In this, its scope is not restricted: 
As White (1992) points out, the subject may be as broad as 
Lenin’s analysis of peasant social formations, or as narrow 
as one of Goffman’s smiles. There are three potential routes 
for selection of the subject.
The first route in its selection may be followed because 
of the researcher’s familiarity with it—a local knowledge 
case—and this will be relevant particularly for the practitio-
ner or student researcher. In one’s own place of work, one’s 
placement, or even one’s home, there will be intimate 
knowledge and ample opportunity for informed, in-depth 
analysis—ample opportunity for identification and discus-
sion, in the words of Bates et al. (1998, pp. 13-14), of “the 
actors, the decision points they faced, the choices they 
made, the paths taken and shunned, and the manner in which 
their choices generated events and outcomes.” The local 
knowledge case is eminently amenable to the “soak and poke” 
of Fenno (1986, 1990) since the inquirer is already soaked, 
and in a good position, one hopes, to poke.
Second, the subject may come into focus because of the 
inherent interest of the case—it may be a key case of a phe-
nomenon or, third, may illuminate the object by virtue of its 
difference, its outlier status. The latter is what Lijphart 
(1971, p. 692) refers to as the deviant case. The essence in 
both types is in gaining what I call elsewhere (Thomas, 
2010) “exemplary knowledge”: The “key-ness” or “outlier-
ness” of the case is manifested in its capacity to exemplify 
the analytical object of the inquiry. This ability to exemplify 
draws its legitimacy from the phronesis of the case inquirer 
(together with that of the reader of the case inquiry), and I 
have argued that the exemplary knowledge thus drawn is 
distinct from the generalizable knowledge associated with 
induction. While opinions on the significance of general-
ization in case study differ (compare de Vaus, 2001; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 2000; 
Yin, 2009)—with discussion of varieties of generalization 
spanning naturalistic generalization (Stake, 1995) to holo-
graphic generalization (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) to fuzzy 
generalization (Bassey, 2001)—I have argued that the valid-
ity of the case study cannot derive from its representative-
ness since it can never legitimately be claimed to form a 
representative sample from a larger set. The essence of 
selection must rest in the dynamic of the relation between 
subject and object. It cannot rest in typicality.
In this choice of the subject, then, I disagree with Yin 
(2009, p. 48) when he suggests that a case may be selected 
because it is “representative or typical.” Even if we know 
that a case is typical following some empirical work to show 
that it is typical—a typical Chicago street, say, in terms of 
the ethnicity and age distribution of its inhabitants—we can-
not draw anything meaningful from this typicality in a case 
study, for the typicality will begin and end with the dimen-
sions by which typicality is framed. We cannot say from 
having studied this street that its circumstances will have in 
any way contributed by their typicality to the particular situ-
ation in which it finds itself (whatever that situation, that 
“object,” is). We could study the street and be informed 
about its problems, its tensions, its intrigues, hostilities, and 
kindnesses, and while these may in some way be of interest 
by virtue of the analytical object of the study, they would 
not be of interest by virtue of the street’s typicality since the 
next typical street would, in terms of such dynamics, in all 
probability, be very different. I explore these distinctions in 
more detail elsewhere (Thomas, 2010; 2011; 2012): In short, 
the notion of typicality may give an unwarranted impression 
to any reader that the significance of the analysis rests in the 
representativeness of the subject. It does not.
I take the subject to be identified, then, in one of three 
principal ways—as a
• local knowledge case, or a
• key case, or an
• outlier case
Object
The object is less straightforwardly identified, and, as 
Ragin (1992) notes, it need not be defined at the outset but, 
rather, may emerge as an inquiry progresses. Whether it is 
set at the outset or is emergent, it will be this analytical 
focus that crystallizes, thickens, or develops as the study 
proceeds: It is the way that this “object” develops that is at 
the heart of the study.
Whichever—“emergent” or set at the outset—it is impor-
tant to have some notion of a potential object in mind when 
the study begins and not to confuse it with the subject. As 
Wieviorka (1992) puts it:
If you want to talk about a “case,” you also need the 
means of interpreting it or placing it in a context. . . . 
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Regardless of the practical approach for studying it, a 
case is an opportunity of relating facts and concepts, 
reality and hypotheses. But do not make the mistake 
of thinking that it is, in itself, a concept. (p. 160)
The object constitutes, then, the analytical frame within 
which the case is viewed and which the case exemplifies. 
For example, in Ball’s (1981) case study of a school, 
Beachside Comprehensive, the school itself is the subject 
that exemplifies the analytical frame, the object, which 
was the process by which change was effected in schools 
in the movement to comprehensive education in the United 
Kingdom. Beachside Comprehensive—the school—was 
the prism through which “facts and concepts, reality and 
hypotheses” about this change were refracted, viewed and 
studied.
Becker (in Ragin, 1992) shows how important it is to see 
the process of employing the object as a dynamic one: As a 
study proceeds the inquirer should be asking the question, 
“What is this a case of” over and over as evidence accu-
mulates around potential explanations or “theories.” As I 
have noted elsewhere (Thomas, 1997; 2007) theory is thus 
forged—it is malleable, rather in the way that Bourdieu 
talked about theory (in Wacquant, 1989, cited in Jenkins, 
1992, p. 67) being a “thinking tool.” As Bourdieu put it, 
“[theory is] a set of thinking tools visible through the results 
they yield, but it is not built as such. . . . It is a temporary 
construct which takes shape for and by empirical work.” 
Eckstein (1975, p. 133) makes the same point, noting that 
the theoretical enterprise of case study is not about testing 
probabilistically stated theories. Rather, it is about discov-
ering or testing tools of explanation.
The focus on the development of theory in case study is 
closely linked with the explication of the analytical object. 
Bourdieu’s emphasis on the theory as tool, therefore, reminds 
us that the elaboration of theory is a means to an end, with 
that end being explanation. It is not an end in itself. The 
development of theory, whether this be in “theory-testing” 
or “theory-seeking,” is central to the dynamic of the relation 
between subject and object in case study, and I explore it 
further in the next section.
Beyond Subject and Object: 
Purpose, Approach, and Process
Methodological discourse stresses a number of themes on 
the direction and organization of case studies—their 
design—and I summarize some of the better-known analy-
ses in Table 1. Constraint of space prohibits full discussion 
of all of these, but I shall outline in a little more detail one 
of the most recent—the analysis from George and Bennett 
(2005, pp. 75-76)—for the purposes of explicating the gen-
eral themes raised by Table 1. Theirs is an especially useful 
analysis, drawing heavily as it does on the widely used 
typologies of Lijphart (1971) and, principally, Eckstein 
(1975). George and Bennett emerge with six types of case 
study. These are:
1. Atheoretical/configurative idiographic case studies—
that is to say, illustrative studies that do not con-
tribute to theory;
2. Disciplined configurative case studies, where 
established theories are used to explain a case;
3. Heuristic case studies wherein new causal paths 
are identified. Outlier cases may be especially 
valuable here;
4. Theory testing case studies, assessing “the valid-
ity and scope conditions of single or competing 
theories”;
5. Plausibility probes—preliminary studies to deter-
mine whether further study is warranted; and
6. “Building Block” studies of particular types or sub-
types “of a phenomenon identify common patterns 
or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose.”
In the establishment of these six types a core distinction 
is being drawn between theoretical and nontheoretical stud-
ies, and this is a feature of several of the other classifica-
tions in Table 1. Beyond this, the classification draws 
attention to illustrative and exploratory studies of one kind 
or another, as do the other classifications in Table 1. Unlike 
Yin and de Vaus, George and Bennett do not expand their 
discussion to a further layer of organization: the operation-
alization of the study—for example, into “parallel,” “longi-
tudinal,” or “embedded” studies.
Notwithstanding these commonalities and differences, the 
principal feature to emerge from a listing of this kind is that 
there is a mixture of criteria for classification. My aim in 
developing a typology is to synthesize by drawing out strands 
of commonality while also integrating, where appropriate, 
classificatory layers and themes—and noting, hopefully to 
understand, differences. Within and between the commentar-
ies I have selected, purposes are mixed with methods that are 
mixed with kinds of subject that are in turn mixed with what 
might be called different operational “shapes” of case study. 
I shall look at these layers of analysis in turn.
Purpose
There is first a layer of criteria that is about purpose. For 
example, the terms “intrinsic” and “instrumental” used by 
Stake, and the term “evaluative” as used by Merriam and 
Bassey, point to a reason for doing the study: its purpose. 
Likewise, the term “plausibility probes” used by Mitchell 
and George and Bennett points to a purpose—of explora-
tion. And Eckstein uses the term “heuristic” to refer to 
exploration; he suggests that heuristic studies can be 
about arriving at notions of problems to solve. The purpose 
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Table 1. Kinds of Case Studies, as Enumerated by Different Analysts
George and 
Bennett (2005, 
drawing on 
Eckstein, 1975)
Merriam 
(1988) Stake (1995) Bassey (1999) de Vaus (2001)
Mitchell (2006) 
(drawing on 
Eckstein, 1975) Yin (2009)
Theory testing Descriptive Intrinsic Theory seeking Descriptive/
explanatory
Illustrative Critical
Atheoretical/
configurative-
idiographic
Interpretative Instrumental Theory testing Theory testing/
theory building
Social analytic Extreme/
unique
Disciplined 
configurative
Evaluative Single/
collective
Storytelling Single/multiple case Extended 
(over time)
Longitudinal
Heuristic — — Picture drawing Holistic/embedded Configurative-
idiographic
Representative
Plausibility 
probes
— — Evaluative Parallel/sequential Disciplined-
configurative
Revelatory
“Building block” 
studies
— — — Retrospective/
prospective
Heuristic —
 Plausibility 
probes
 
is intimately connected with the object of the study: The 
understanding that is required—the explanation that is 
needed—will be related to the reason for doing the study, 
that is to say, the purpose.
Approach and Methods
Next, there is the approach that is adopted. It is in this 
“layer” that there are the clearest distinctions between kinds 
of study, reflecting the broad nature of the object and the 
purpose of the study. Even though those differences exist, 
a centrality is given in the commentaries to the significance 
of theory in the conduct of the study, wherein studies that 
are not in some way theoretical are specifically labeled as 
such. Thus, in the categorizations of George and Bennett 
and that of Mitchell (both borrowing from Eckstein) case 
studies that have no theoretical element are termed 
“atheoretical/configurative-idiographic,” in part to high-
light the illustrative nature of the work in hand. As Lijphart 
(1971, p. 691) puts it, these nontheoretical studies “are 
entirely descriptive and move in a theoretical vacuum.” 
Likewise, Bassey makes a distinction between, on the one 
side, two kinds of theoretical case study (theory seeking 
and theory testing), and on the other those he labels “pic-
ture drawing” and “story telling.”
Thus, one might say that the object of a study may be, 
essentially (a) theoretical, or (b) illustrative. As far as the 
former is concerned—the theoretical study—the distinction 
Bassey draws between theory testing and theory seeking 
highlights the different kinds of stance that may be taken 
about the object: It may be set clearly at the outset (theory 
testing) or developed throughout the study (theory seeking).
After a decision about approach, there are choices to be 
made about the methods to be adopted. Will the study be 
entirely interpretative in orientation: Will it be an ethnog-
raphy? Will it use a combination of methods, possibly 
incorporating experimental (e.g., using “repeated measures” 
as in Stake’s example), survey, or cross-sectional elements? 
Will it involve documentary analysis? Given the method-
ological pluralism noted earlier the choices here are abundant. 
They will, in turn, lead to questions about the operational 
process of the study—the means by which it is constructed 
and the means by which the object is understood and 
refracted through the subject. It is this operational process 
to which I now turn.
Process
In this classificatory layer, case inquirers are making deci-
sions about the operational processes of their studies. For 
this, they need first to return to their subjects (as distinct 
from the object) and to the boundary decisions made at the 
outset. There has to be an examination of the nature of the 
choices that were made at that time about the parameters 
that delimit the subject of the study. These may fall around 
a number of loci: The case may be defined by one or more 
of a range of boundary considerations: person, time period, 
place, event, institution, or any of a range of singular phe-
nomena that can be studied in their complexity. The first 
consideration, though, concerns an important distinction 
that has been raised by Stake (2005, p. 445) that will deter-
mine the process of the case study, and this is about whether 
there is to be a comparative element to the study: Should it 
be single or multiple? This single/multiple distinction is at 
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the base of much discussion—and confusion—about the 
case study, emerging principally from Lijphart’s exclusion 
of what he called (and is still sometimes called) “compara-
tive research” from the case study family. I shall discuss the 
latter in a moment, after considering the central distinction.
Single or multiple. The case study, while it is of the singu-
lar, may contain more than one element in its subject and if 
this is so—that is, if there are two or several cases—each 
individual case is less important in itself than the compari-
son that each offers with the others. For example, a study 
might be conducted of two schools’ different capacities for 
making effective use of a visiting education support service. 
By contrasting the schools’ “biographies”—their histories, 
catchments, staff relationships, and other characteristics—
light would be thrown on the relative dynamics affecting 
the reception and use of the support service. The key focus 
would not be on the nature and shape of relationships per se 
in one school but rather on the nature of the difference 
between the one and the other and what this might tell us 
about the dynamics that were significant in this difference. 
This comparative element is why Schwandt (2001) calls 
this kind of case study cross-case analysis.
But one now needs to raise the methodological issue to 
which I alluded a moment ago concerning the firm distinc-
tion that Lijphart (1971) posited between comparative study 
and case study. It is a differentiation that has been troubling 
for subsequent discourse about the nature and “shape” of 
case study. Lijphart’s influential typology—his six types of 
case study, distinguished, as they are, from comparative 
study—presents to us, if we do not read them in the context 
of four subsequent decades of methodological discussion, 
some profound misunderstandings. Not many would now 
agree with Lijphart, for example, that “the analytical power 
of the comparative method increases the closer it approxi-
mates the statistical and experimental methods” (p. 693). 
Lijphart’s epistemological stance, disclosed by comments 
such as this throughout his seminal article perhaps betrays 
the methodological tensions existing at the time he was 
writing (see Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). Whatever the 
reason for his stance, the legacy of his disaggregation of the 
comparative study from the case study has been confusion 
about the nature of the case. Suffice it to say that the com-
parative study is more straightforwardly seen as part of the 
case study family if one puts the emphasis on the subject—
which can be singular or plural—rather than the case.
The boundary and the shape. The choice about single or 
multiple studies determines what follows in the shape of 
the case study. Single studies, containing no element of 
comparison, will take essentially three forms, wherein per-
sonal or systemic features of the subject are bounded by 
time in some shape or form. The case inquirer notices change 
as it happens and seeks its antecedents and its consequences. 
We have to find the “sequence of steps” as Becker puts it 
(1992, p. 209) and understand cause in relation to time, 
with “each step understood as preceding in time the one 
that follows it.” In doing this we conjecture not only about 
how one thing is related to another but also about how 
cause and effect change with time as other elements of a 
situation also change.
I suggest (drawing on other commentators) that the vari-
eties of time-use lead to three kinds of study: retrospective, 
snapshot, and diachronic. The retrospective study is the 
simplest, involving the collection of data relating to a past 
phenomenon of any kind. The researcher is looking back on 
a phenomenon, situation, person, or event or studying it in 
its historical integrity. With the snapshot the case is being 
examined in one defined period of time: a current event, a 
day in the life of a person, a month’s diary of a marriage. 
Whether a month, a week, a day, or even a period as short 
as an hour, the analysis will be aided by the temporal juxta-
position of events. The snapshot develops, the picture pre-
senting itself as a Gestalt over a tight time frame. The 
diachronic study shows change over time. I use the term 
“diachronic” to refer to change over time in preference to 
the word “longitudinal” principally to avoid confusion with 
other kinds of longitudinal research. The essence, though, is 
the same as that in “longitudinal”: Data capture occurs at 
points a, b, c . . . n, and one’s interest is in the changes 
occurring at the two or more data collection points.
For multiple studies the researcher considers additional 
features of the situation. How can the different studies be 
used for comparison—for cross-case analysis in Schwandt’s 
(2001) terms? There are two principal means of doing this: 
first by straightforward comparison between clearly differ-
ent examples, as in Burgess’s (1984) 10 case studies of 
research in educational settings, and the contrast between 
and among the cases throws the spotlight on an important 
theoretical feature. Second, comparison may be of elements 
within one case—comparison, in other words, of nested ele-
ments. With nested studies the breakdown is within the 
principal unit of analysis—for example, wards within a hos-
pital. A nested study is distinct from a straightforwardly 
multiple study in that it gains its integrity, its wholeness, 
from the wider case. For example, a researcher might be 
looking at three wards within one hospital, but if the one 
hospital had no significance other than its physical housing 
of these three wards then the cases would not be seen as 
nested. The elements are nested only in the sense that they 
form an integral part of a broader picture.
A further subdivision may be drawn in the multiple 
study, and this is between parallel and sequential studies. In 
the first, the parallel study, the cases are all happening and 
being studied concurrently, while with the sequential study 
the cases happen consecutively and there is an assumption 
that what has happened in one or in an intervening period 
will in some way affect the next.
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Integrating the Layers: A Typology
Having separated the classificatory layers drawn in dis-
course about case study, I now propose a typology in which 
they are organized and reintegrated. The typology, incorpo-
rating considerations about these layers—concerning subject 
and object, purpose, approach, and process—is summa-
rized in Figure 1. While this perhaps implies sequencing to 
the choices being made, in most cases much of the decision 
making will in fact occur simultaneously, particularly in 
relation to the subject, object, and approach. The typology 
offers a “flattened-out” view of the thinking that occurs in 
the process of research design.
As the typology in a sense “unrolls” the various consid-
erations being made in the design of a case study it perhaps 
implies that a series of separate design choices are being 
made during the planning of the study. It perhaps thus, 
at first glance, denies the coherence and simultaneity of 
the design decisions of which I have just spoken. But for the 
researcher new to case study the mere existence of these 
decisions may not have occurred. As a consequence, 
the variety of design paths will be restricted. A typology 
encourages a clear articulation of the distinctness and neces-
sity of both subject and object; it encourages consideration 
of theoretical or illustrative approaches, methodological deci-
sions, and decisions about process: Can the research ques-
tion be addressed by a single focus on one person or situation, 
or would a comparison be better? Is there a time element 
that will be addressed by looking at a sequence of events, or 
is it better to examine one tightly defined period in time? 
Would it be helpful to extract a number of nested elements 
from the main focus and to examine these in detail? It is 
useful to explore all of these considerations alongside 
thought about subject, object, theory, and method.
Two Examples: Routes  
Through the Typology
Using a set of linked case studies, Diamond (2005) devel-
ops a complex thesis about how societies collapse. He 
looks at a range of communities and societies that have 
collapsed or are currently in the process of collapsing. The 
title—Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or 
Survive—is the object of the research, while the subject is 
the set of societies he selects to illuminate and understand 
the object: today’s Montana, Easter Island of the 17th 
century, Pitcairn, the Mayans, the Vikings, and modern 
Haiti. Each one is quite different from the others, but they 
are connected by decline and collapse, the object. The 
theoretical explanation that “thickens” around the object 
is that the decline of a society happens because the soci-
ety’s response to change is insufficient to address a range 
of potential factors, from hostile neighbors to environ-
mental change and degradation.
So, using the typology, Diamond’s was a multiple study 
possessing both subject and object. It involved key exam-
ples of collapse. It was of intrinsic interest, containing 
exploratory elements, and the aim was to explain collapse 
through theory building. Let me take just one example from 
his multiple study, that of Easter Island, to show how he 
proceeded. He theorized about how the Easter Islanders 
sought and used resources, from the intensification of their 
agriculture using windbreaks and pits for better growing to 
the division of the island into a number of territories that 
eventually competed with one another. Using a variety of 
methods and data collection techniques from the use of 
existing data sets—botanical, cultural, historical—to visit-
ing and interviewing he examined Easter Island’s history, 
geography, and culture. He looked at what the people ate, 
drawing from research using pollen and charcoal remains 
that gave clues about now-extinct crops. Using archaeo-
logical evidence and oral history he looked and the likely 
structure of the society, at the people’s attitudes to death 
and the afterlife, at how statues might have been sculpted, 
transported, and erected. He then wove all of this together 
using intelligent questioning and answering—essentially, 
the Socratic method—in the context of the other, parallel 
studies he was collecting to come to a thesis about collapse. 
While there would have been an integrity to much of the 
decision making in this design, an analysis of that decision 
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Figure 1. A typology of case study
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Figure 2. Diamond’s study of societal collapse
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Figure 3. Zigler and Muenchow’s (1992) study of the Head Start education program
making can be displayed as a trajectory through the typol-
ogy, and this is summarized in Figure 2.
As a second example I have taken Zigler and 
Muenchow’s (1992) study of the Head Start education 
program. It is a much-cited study with a clear subject 
(Head Start) but perhaps a less easily identifiable object. It 
is a local knowledge case—these were key figures in the 
program, coauthoring the presidential report on it. The 
object could perhaps be said to be the working and the suc-
cess of the program, with lessons to be learned, but this is 
not clearly defined. It is, essentially, a chronicle with 
observations, analyses of what went right and wrong, and 
a set of conclusions and recommendations. It is not con-
textualized, as Wieviorka (1992, p. 160) puts it, in an 
“analytical category or theory”—whether that be expen-
sive national education programs, attempts at top-down 
change, the operation of early childhood programs, or 
whatever. What was it, in other words, that was to be 
explained? What was the explanandum? The study was 
essentially descriptive and illustrative, and we can say that 
via various methods—the recollections of the authors, dis-
cussions with others, and interrogation of official and 
unofficial records—this was a single, retrospective study 
(see Figure 3).
As a rider, one might note that the comparison of the 
two cases via the typology gives a means for assessing 
what a case study is trying to do and how it proceeds to 
do that.
Concluding Comments
The “weak sibling” status of the case study noted by Yin 
(2009, p. xiii) is due at least in part to the uncertainty felt 
by intending researchers about structure and method. As 
the design of the case study is presented often as open-ended 
and untethered—and methodological eclecticism is empha-
sized in commentary on design—researchers may feel 
unguided about structure: Open-endedness is extended to 
an unwarranted expectation of structural looseness, and, in 
the absence of a structure that maps out potential routes to 
follow, important pointers may be missed. I have, therefore, 
suggested a typology that foregrounds a number of fea-
tures—classificatory layers—of the study: the distinction 
between subject and object, the importance of clarifying the 
purpose of the study, an awareness of the likely analytical 
approach to be pursued, and an identification of the likely 
process to be followed in conducting it. I hope that the 
typology will assist in both the construction and analysis of 
case studies.
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